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RELIEVING THE TENSION: NEW MEXICO’S
DEPARTURE FROM THE FEDERAL POSITION
THAT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO
PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
TO THE GRAND JURY
Brett Eaton*

I. INTRODUCTION
The modern grand jury is the result of two polar predecessors in
purpose. Originally, the grand jury was established to ensure that people
accused of crimes would be brought to trial.1 Over time, this purpose
shifted to a protector of the citizens who were accused of crimes.2 These
dual purposes are both present in the modern understanding of the grand
jury.
The conflicting purposes of the grand jury have made it difficult for
courts to resolve disputes resulting from grand jury proceedings. In addition to the internal tension in the grand jury, there is also a tension that
the grand jury is supposed to be independent of the branches of
government.3
New Mexico has deviated from the federal view of what an independent grand jury means. The grand jury is independent of other branches
of government in both the U.S. Constitution and New Mexico constitution. Because the grand jury is independent, the federal approach is that
the courts should not get involved in overseeing grand jury proceedings.4
However, the New Mexico approach allows the courts and legislature to
get involved in order to ensure that the grand jury stays independent.5 In
fact, a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court created a procedure to enforce a law enacted by the state legislature that allows a tar-

* University of New Mexico, Class of 2012. The author thanks Professor
Elizabeth Rapaport and Melissa Eaton for their valuable advice and support.
1. See GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY 7 (G.T. Bisel Co. 1973)
(1906).
2. See id. at 27.
3. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992).
4. See id. at 49.
5. See Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 200 P.3d 523, 532.
467
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get to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury through the
prosecutor.6
Jones v. Murdoch established a pre-indictment procedure to resolve
disputes between targets and prosecutors under section 31-6-11(B).7
Jones, the target of an investigation, offered an argumentative letter to
the prosecutor, referencing items of potentially exculpatory evidence.8
The prosecutor refused to present some of the evidence which the prosecutor believed was not exculpatory under section 31-6-11(B).9 As a result,
Jones sought relief from the New Mexico Supreme Court.10 In response to
Jones, the Supreme Court of New Mexico established a pre-indictment
procedure for targets and prosecutors to follow.11 Under this procedure,
the target must write a non-argumentative letter stating the evidence that
he believes to be exculpatory and what he wants introduced to the grand
jury.12 In addition, the target must write a cover letter explaining why the
evidence is relevant.13 Both letters go to the prosecutor.14 If the prosecutor feels that some of the evidence is not exculpatory or admissible before
the grand jury, he will write a letter describing his position.15 This letter,
as well as both of the target’s letters, are sent to the magistrate judge for a
decision.16
The pre-indictment procedure is significant for New Mexico because
it runs counter to the federal view of the court’s relationship to the grand
jury. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that prosecutors have no obligation to present exculpatory evidence.17 In reaching their decision, the Supreme Court relied on the understanding that the court has no
supervisory power over the grand jury.18 Contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding, the New Mexico Supreme Court used their supervisory
power to create a mechanism that implements the legislature’s intent of
providing more information to the grand jury under section 31-6-11(B).19
This article will look at the reasoning behind the New Mexico Supreme

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, 200 P.3d 523.
Id. ¶ 10, 200 P.3d at 528.
Id. ¶ 3 200 P.3d at 526.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 200 P.3d at 528.
Id. ¶ 33, 200 P.3d at 535.
Id. ¶ 35, 200 P.3d at 535.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36, 200 P.3d at 536.
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003).
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Court’s decision to establish a pre-indictment process for the introduction
of exculpatory evidence, how this reasoning differed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Williams, and its implications on the grand
jury process of New Mexico.
Part II of this note discusses the background of the grand jury system and how it has evolved to its present state. Part III discusses the
federal courts’ understanding of the grand jury. A survey of Supreme
Court and circuit cases over the years is examined to see the deference
the court has given the grand jury. These cases lead up to the Supreme
Court case of United States v. Williams. This part concludes by looking at
the Court’s reasoning behind the rule set forth in Williams, which does
not require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence.
Part IV looks at how the New Mexico courts have viewed the grand
jury. Similarly to Part III, this part looks at cases from New Mexico courts
dealing with the grand jury. It also looks at the law which allows targets
to alert the grand jury to exculpatory evidence. This part ends with an indepth look at the factual background to the Jones case, as well as the
reasoning of the court.
Part V provides analyses of the different approaches the Williams
Court and Jones court took to reach their decisions. It looks at the supervisory powers of the courts, the historical understanding of the grand juries and the role legislative action took in the courts’ reasoning. Finally
this part looks at the importance of a pre-indictment remedy and
procedure.
Part VI concludes this article by discussing the implications of the
new pre-indictment procedure on grand jury practice in New Mexico.
II. GRAND JURY BACKGROUND
The U.S. grand jury system derived from the English grand jury,
which history dates back over 900 years.
A. Grand Jury History
There is uncertainty about the origins of the modern-day grand
jury.20 However, it was in 1368 A.D. that the “graunde inquest,” an entity
similar to the modern-day grand jury, was established to “inquire of and
present offences for the county at large.”21 Yet, the graunde inquest was
not the first body organized to accuse. Rather, the graunde inquest was a

20. Id.
21. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 2.

R
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spin-off of a type of accusing jury established by the Assize of Clarendon
in 1166.22 Under the Assize of Clarendon,
it was enacted “that inquiry be made in each county and in each
hundred, by twelve lawful men of the hundred and four lawful
men of every township—who are sworn to say truly whether in
their hundred or township there is any man accused of being or
notorious as a robber, or a murderer or a thief . . . since the king
began to reign.”23

This statute turned crimes into offenses against the crown and allowed
them to be tried in the king’s itinerant courts.24
The accusing jury’s function changed periodically from 1166 until
the fourteenth century, when the graunde inquest emerged.25 The
graunde inquest was initially an arm of the government, used to reveal all
crime and criminals, where the members of the inquest were required to
inform the court with the rationale for their verdicts and the evidentiary
reasons for their conclusion.26 Thus, the main purpose of this original
form of the grand jury, the graunde inquest, was to ensure individuals
suspected of criminal conduct would be reported and tried.27 However,
over time the graunde inquest began to change into an independent
power to act as a buffer between the crown and the people.28
The independence of the grand jury is the result of rules being established which no longer required the jurors to inform the court about
the evidence used, new-found secrecy of jury meetings, and an oath of
secrecy.29 The oath of secrecy “contained no reservation in favor of the
government.”30 With the grand jury free from court control, and acting in
secrecy, it could protect the citizens of the country from the unjust actions
of the government.31 From this fractured past and foundation of contradictory purposes, it is easy to see the two polar views of the grand jury as
first, the “conserver of [man’s] liberties, and the noblest check upon mal-

22. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1:01 (1986).
23. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 7 (quoting Lesser’s Historical Jury System 138).
24. Id.
25. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02. For information on the transformation and numerous roles that the accusing jury took on in its transformation to the
graunde inquest see EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 7–25.
26. Id. at 27.
27. See BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02.
28. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 27.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id.
31. See id.

R
R
R
R
R
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ice and oppression of individuals and states,” and second, “purely mischievous and a relic of barbarism.”32
B. Grand Jury Today
The grand jury system, which was adopted through the Fifth
Amendment by the federal government, was based on the English version.33 The purpose of the grand jury is to “‘provide a fair method for
instituting criminal proceedings against persons believed to have committed crimes.’”34 The grand jury performs two distinct functions: to investigate and to indict.35 Under the investigating role, the grand jury looks into
whether a crime has been committed.36 Under the indictment role, the
grand jury determines, once an accusation has been made, if there is sufficient evidence to support going to trial.37 As a result, the grand jury is
referred to as “both a shield and a sword,” because the investigative
power is an offensive tool for the government to discover criminal activity, and the indictment power protects citizens from unfounded charges.38
Under the investigatory power, the grand jury “‘can investigate merely
on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not.’”39 In doing so, the grand jury should “inquire
into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it
has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred.”40
While the Fifth Amendment requires an indictment by a grand jury
to prosecute someone federally,41 that requirement is not extended to the
states.42 Rather, each state is left to decide what role, if any, a grand jury
will play in state prosecutions.43 In Hurtado v. California, the Supreme
Court chose not to use the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the
grand jury doctrine of the Fifth Amendment.44 Without a federal constitutional requirement, “many states have abolished the grand jury alto-

32. Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
33. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL GRAND
JURY PRACTICE 1 (2008).
34. Id. (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)).
35. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:07.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 30.
39. United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (quoting United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950)).
40. Id.
41. FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 8.
42. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:05.
43. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
44. Id.

R

R
R
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gether in favor of other methods or pre-trial trial screening.”45 Each state
can independently define the role of the prosecutor, court and grand jury
through their constitution and statutes.46
C. New Mexico Grand Jury
Unlike federal requirements, New Mexico does not limit prosecutions to those initiated by a grand jury indictment.47 When a grand jury is
convened, it is done by an order of a judge and requires at least twelve
people.48 However, unlike the federal system, a person can face prosecution after a prosecutor presents an information.49 Unlike the federal
grand jury system, the New Mexico legislature has provided a rule which
allows “the target or his counsel [to] alert the grand jury to the existence
of evidence that would disprove or reduce an accusation or that would
make an indictment unjustified, by notifying the prosecuting attorney
who is assisting the grand jury in writing regarding the existence of that
evidence.”50
III. FEDERAL VIEW OF THE GRAND JURY
In United States v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court established
that there was no duty on the prosecutor to provide exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury.51 The Court held that it lacked the supervisory power to
address whether exculpatory evidence could be presented to the grand
jury.52 Leading up to the Williams decision, the Court addressed many
issues involving the grand jury system and a court’s relationship to the
grand jury.
A. Supreme Court Cases Leading Up to Williams
In Costello v. United States, the Court answered the question of
whether an indictment could be based on hearsay.53 The result of Costello
was that an indictment was “valid even if it is based exclusively on hear-

45. R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and
Enforcing the Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 361, 363 (2000).
46. See BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 9:32.
47. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003).
51. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
52. Id.
53. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).

R
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say evidence.”54 The defendant in Costello was indicted for willfully attempting to evade payment of income taxes.55 The defendant claimed his
Fifth Amendment right was violated because the testimony before the
grand jury was based on hearsay evidence.56 In response, the Court chose
to limit the burden on the grand jury by stating, “neither the Fifth
Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of
evidence upon which grand juries must act.”57 In addition to no constitutional limitations, the Court said that historically grand juries were “not
hampered by rigid procedural or evidential [sic] rules.”58
The Court continued its practice of not burdening or delaying the
work of the grand jury by refusing to review the evidence considered by
the grand jury in United States v. Calandra.59 Calandra dealt with the
question of whether a grand jury witness could refuse to answer questions
“based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.”60 Federal agents had obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s place of
business to look for specific items related to bookmaking and wagering.61
However, the agents went beyond the scope of their warrant when they
seized other property on the premises, which was the basis of defendant’s
appeal.62
In beginning its analysis, the Court first pointed out some historical
qualities of grand juries, including their broad power to inquire into criminal violations, secret deliberations, power to compel testimony, and that
no judge presides over or monitors the proceedings.63 The Court believed
that “[w]hen the grand jury is performing its investigatory function . . . society’s interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation.”64 As a result the Court concluded that in order to perform
these functions, the grand jury would need to look at all available evidence.65 As in Costello v. United States, an indictment is not made invalid
by the character of the evidence and is not subject to challenge or review.66 This is because the grand jury does not “finally adjudicate guilt or

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 10:06.
Costello, 350 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id.
See 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962)).
Id.
Id. at 344–45.

R
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innocence,” and as a result, has “traditionally been allowed to pursue its
investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary
and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial.”67 The Court
was concerned with any “holding that would saddle a grand jury with
minitrials and preliminary showings,” which would result in the grand
jury work being impeded or delayed.68
B. Circuit Court Cases Leading Up to Williams
In United States v. Basurto, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
consequences to a prosecutor who knows grand jury testimony, and the
subsequent grand jury indictment, was based in part on perjured testimony.69 Basurto, along with fourteen others, was charged with conspiring
to import and distribute marijuana.70 A co-conspirator, William Barron,
was one of two grand jury witnesses to testify about Basurto’s involvement.71 Before the trial, Barron informed the prosecuting attorney that all
of his grand jury testimony about Basurto was untrue.72
In its analysis, the court discussed concern that over the years there
has been an increase in the power of the prosecutor over the grand jury
and a coinciding decrease in the grand jury’s independence.73 The court
held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated
when a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment which the government knows is based partially on perjured testimony, when the perjured
testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached.”74 Notwithstanding this holding, the increase in judicial involvement in grand jury
proceedings under the Basurto decision has generally not been followed.75
In a related issue, the court in United States v. Gray addressed the
effect of introducing exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.76 When the
case was heard, the federal courts were turning “a more discerning eye
towards the evidentiary basis of a grand jury’s indictment,” including dismissing cases where prosecutors were aware of, but failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.77 However, in Gray the prosecutor
was not aware of the exculpatory evidence, which had the prosecutor
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id.
BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 10:06.
502 F. Supp. 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 152.

R
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been aware it would have been a prerequisite for dismissal.78 The court
stated that the “prosecutor is not obligated to sift through all the evidence to find statements or documents that might be exculpatory.”79 As a
result, the court held that the defendant could seek relief at trial by
presenting the exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor failed to
present.80
A few years later, in United States v. Page, the Tenth Circuit took up
the question of a prosecutor’s requirement to present exculpatory evidence.81 In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit looked at the two major views in
the federal courts dealing with the issue at the time.82 The first view was
that there was no duty for the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury.83 This was the rule in the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, its reasoning being that the grand jury did not judge guilt or innocence, but merely probable cause.84 The alternative view was that the
grand jury should hear all relevant information, including exculpatory evidence that clearly negates guilt.85
The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits adopted the rule that the
grand jury should hear all exculpatory evidence.86 However, this rule does
not require the prosecutor to “ferret out and present every bit of potentially exculpatory evidence,” but to present substantially exculpatory evidence discovered through the course of investigation.87 The court
believed that applying this rule would promote judicial economy.88 The
economy would result from the grand jury having more information to
properly exclude cases from going to trial that could not pass a probable
cause standard, or the much higher standard of reasonable doubt which
trials require.89 While the court placed a higher standard for prosecutors
to present evidence which clearly negates guilt, it believed that in this

78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting United States v. Ollin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120, 1128-29
(W.D.N.Y. 1979)).
80. Id. at 153.
81. 808 F.2d 723, 727 (10th Cir.1987).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id; United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 937-38 (6th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Civella, 666 F.2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981).
85. Page, 800 F.2d at 727.
86. See id; United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1979).
87. Page, 808 F.2d at 728.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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case there was no violation because the evidence was not clearly
exculpatory.90
C. United States v. Williams
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court ended the conflicting positions
among the circuits when it held in United States v. Williams that courts
have no authority to impose a duty on the prosecuting attorney to present
exculpatory evidence before a grand jury.91
Williams arose out of a controversy in the Tenth Circuit, where the
Court of Appeals applied the Page ruling, which requires “that substantial exculpatory evidence discovered during the course of an investigation
be revealed to the grand jury.”92 The Supreme Court did not address the
issue of disclosing exculpatory evidence to the grand jury as a question of
duty imposed by the Fifth Amendment, but instead looked at the court’s
supervisory power over the grand jury.93 The Supreme Court had previously ruled that courts’
supervisory power can be used to dismiss an indictment because
of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that misconduct amounts to a violation of one of those “few, clear rules which
were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.”94

However, the Supreme Court held that this supervisory power is narrow,
available only to provide courts the ability to enforce legally compelled
standards, but not to prescribe them in the first place.95
According to the Court, the inability of the courts to prescribe rules
for the grand jury is due to the historical independence of the grand jury
system.96 The theory behind the grand jury was that it should not work for
any branch of government, but be a buffer or referee between the people
and government.97 When the grand jury system was adopted by the
United States from the previous English system, it was not mentioned in
the Constitution until the Bill of Rights.98 As a result, it is not “textually
assigned” to any branches of the government mentioned in the first three

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992).
Id. at 44 n.4 (quoting United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (1981)).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986)).
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
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Articles.99 Even though there are connections with the judicial branch,
any relationship between the grand jury and the judiciary has traditionally been at “arm’s length.”100 According to the Court, the Fifth Amendment presupposes that the grand jury is independent of “either
prosecuting attorney or judge.”101
Because of the separate nature of the grand jury, the Supreme
Court has been “reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory power as a
basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.”102 The Court is concerned with disrupting the traditional nature of the grand jury as a body
of laymen, unfettered by technical rules.103 As a result, the Court does not
engage in “judicial reshaping of the grand jury institution” or altering
“the traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the constituting
court, and the grand jury itself.”104
The Supreme Court believed that “requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand
jury’s historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.”105 Historically, it had been sufficient for the grand jury to hear
only the prosecutor’s side for the purpose of determining whether an indictment or accusation was appropriate.106 This had been done not by
looking at how the charge could be denied, but by looking at what foundation the prosecutor could establish for the charge.107 As a result,
throughout the history of grand juries, it has been thought that the target
never had the right to testify or have exculpatory evidence presented
before a grand jury.108
The Supreme Court kept with its view of history by ruling that an
obligation on the part of the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence
would be incompatible with the grand jury system.109 The grand jury itself
has no obligation to hear any evidence, including exculpatory evidence,
and as a result, the Court saw no reason why the prosecution should be
obligated to provide it.110 Based on the historical roles and relationship

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 49–50.
103. Id. at 50 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id. at 51–52.
107. Id. at 52.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 53.
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between the court and the grand jury, the Supreme Court, in an attempt
to follow tradition, held that courts have no power to prescribe a duty on
the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence.111
IV. NEW MEXICO VIEW OF THE GRAND JURY
New Mexico has a different view than the federal government regarding the independence and role of the grand jury. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has found that it has some supervisory power over the
grand jury, and that the legislature has plenary power to make laws that
affect the grand jury.112 In recent years, the laws have reflected a desire to
provide more protection for targets, and more information to the grand
jury.113 This view is reflected in the progression of cases dealing with the
grand jury.
A. Cases Leading Up to Jones v. Murdoch
In State v. Herrera the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of dismissal where a prosecutor knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand jury, some of which was deemed clearly exculpatory.114 Previously, New Mexico courts assumed that a prosecutor denied
a defendant due process when he withheld exculpatory evidence.115
Abiding by precedent, the Court of Appeals held that when exculpatory evidence is knowingly withheld, it is a violation of due process.116
The court said that the grand jury has a duty to protect citizens from
unfounded accusations, and that when a prosecutor knowingly chooses to
leave out evidence which could negate the guilt of a target, the grand jury
loses its independence in making a probable cause claim and becomes a
tool of the prosecution.117 Instead, according to the court the prosecutor
should be seeking justice, not indictment, and the presentation of any
potentially exculpatory evidence should be viewed objectively.118
Two years after Herrera, the New Mexico Supreme Court had an
opportunity to address the issue of prosecutors withholding potentially

111. Id. at 55.
112. Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 200 P.3d 523, 532.
113. See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-302A; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11
(2003).
114. 93 N.M. 442, 434–44, 601 P.2d 75, 76–77 (Ct. App. 1979), overruled in part by
Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692 (1981).
115. Id. at 444, 601 P.2d at 77.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 444–45, 601 P.2d at 77–78.
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exculpatory evidence from a grand jury.119 In Buzbee v. Donnelly, the
court looked at the grand jury proceedings of targets alleged to have participated in a prison riot.120 Unlike the situation in Herrera, there was a
question about whether the evidence, which was withheld by the prosecutor, was truly exculpatory.121
Previously, New Mexico had a requirement that, “[a]ll evidence
must be such as would be legally admissible upon trial,” for the prosecutor to be able to present it to the grand jury.122 However, at the time of
the case the rule had changed, and the new requirement was based on
prosecutorial bad faith.123 The court said that rules of admissibility would
apply to the admittance of exculpatory evidence as well.124 Thus, the court
determined that some of the withheld exculpatory evidence would not
have been admissible and was properly withheld by the prosecutor.125 In
addition to having a requirement that the evidence be admissible at trial,
the court also limited the admission of evidence that must be directly
exculpatory, not just circumstantially exculpatory.126 Direct evidence in
general, according to the court, was “evidence which, if believed, proves
the existence of the fact without inference or presumption.”127 This limitation on what type of exculpatory evidence was based on the legislature
using the term “directly” negating guilt.128
The New Mexico Supreme Court believed these rules and their application did not violate a target’s due process rights.129 The court was
further concerned that “opening up indictments for challenge would halt
the orderly progress of investigations, would cause extended litigation on
unimportant issues and would frustrate the public’s interest in the fair
and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.”130 As a result, the
New Mexico Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals’ Herrera
decision.131

119. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981).
120. Id. at 694, 634 P.2d at 1246.
121. Id. at 695, 634 P.2d at 1247.
122. Id. at 698, 634 P.2d at 1250 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 31-6-11(B)
(2003)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 699, 634 P.2d at 1251.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 701, 634 P.2d at 1254.
127. Id. at 700, 634 P.2d at 1252.
128. Id. at 701, 634 P.2d at 1254.
129. Id. at 707, 634 P.2d at 1259.
130. Id. at 706, 634 P.2d at 1258.
131. Id. at 706, 634 P.2d at 1258.
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A few years later, the New Mexico Court of Appeals drew from the
Buzbee holding when they ruled on a claim by Steve Hewitt that the state
failed to provide exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.132 In State v.
Hewitt, the defendant provided a letter addressed to the grand jury that
mentioned the available pieces of exculpatory evidence but did not provide the evidence at the time.133 After receiving the letter, the grand jury
made the decision that they did not want to see the evidence mentioned
in the letter.134 As a result of this denial, the defendant filed a motion to
quash the indictment because the state failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.135
The court ruled that a three-prong test must be satisfied to dismiss
an indictment for failure by the state to provide exculpatory evidence.136
This test requires:
First, defendant must establish demonstrable prejudice resulting
from the acts or omissions of the prosecutor. Second, the evidence
which is claimed to be exculpatory must constitute evidence directly negating the guilt of defendant, as opposed to evidence
which indirectly negates defendant’s guilt. Third, the evidence
aimed to be exculpatory must be evidence which would be legally
admissible at trial.137

Using the test, the court ruled that it was an error for the trial court
to dismiss the indictment.138 The evidence provided by Hewitt did not satisfy the three-prong test.139 One of the pieces of evidence was a polygraph
examination that the court thought did not directly negate guilt because it
did not specifically address some of the defendant’s charges.140 The court
also put the burden on the defendant attempting to quash the indictment
to prove that the three prongs were met.141 This burden is difficult to meet
because the prosecutor is given wide discretion in determining what evidence is provided, and the grand jury ultimately has the decision of what
evidence they will see.142

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

State v. Hewitt, 108 N.M. 179, 182, 769 P.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 181, 769 P.2d at 94.
Id. at 182, 769 P.2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 184, 769 P.2d at 97.
Id.
Id. at 183, 769 P.2d at 96.
Id.
Id.
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Ten years later, in State v. Lucero, the New Mexico Supreme Court
applied the three-prong test to uphold a murder conviction that was appealed partly on a claim to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide
exculpatory evidence.143 The defendant claimed that the state erred by
not providing eyewitness testimony that would have identified someone
else as the shooter.144 While applying the test, the court took a limited
view of when an indictment could be dismissed. An indictment can be
dismissed when “the prosecutor has clearly abused the grand jury process,”145 with the understanding that the “prosecutor ‘is invested with
wide discretion as to the selection and presentation of evidence.’”146 Ultimately, the court found the defendant failed the first prong of the test by
not “showing a substantial probability of a different outcome.”147
B. Change in the Law
In 2003, the New Mexico Legislature changed the language of section 31-6-11(B)148 to provide the grand jury with more information.149
Under the new language, defendants are allowed to alert the grand jury
of exculpatory evidence by notifying the prosecutor.150 With this newly
created relationship between the target and the prosecutor, it was foreseeable that disputes would arise as to what evidence would be deemed
exculpatory.151 This was the issue that the New Mexico Supreme Court
took up in Jones v. Murdoch.152

143. 1998-NMSC-044, 972 P.2d 1143.
144. Id. ¶ 16, 972 P.2d at 1147.
145. Id. ¶ 17, 972 P.2d at 1147 (quoting Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 696–97,
634 P.2d 1244, 1248–49 (1981)).
146. Id. ¶ 19, 972 P.2d at 1148 (quoting State v. Hewitt, 108 N.M. 179, 183, 769 P.2d
92, 96).
147. Id.
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 31-6-11(B) (2003). The statute reads:
It is the duty of the grand jury to weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and
when it has reason to believe that other lawful, competent and relevant evidence is available that would disprove or reduce a charge or accusation or
that would make an indictment unjustified, then it shall order the evidence
produced. At least twenty-four hours before grand jury proceedings begin,
the target or his counsel may alert the grand jury to the existence of evidence
that would disprove or reduce an accusation or that would make an indictment unjustified, by notifying the prosecuting attorney who is assisting the
grand jury in writing regarding the existence of that evidence.

149.
150.
151.
152.

See Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 42, 200 P.3d 523, 537 (2009).
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 31-6-11(B).
Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 28, 200 P.3d at 533.
2009-NMSC-002, 200 P.3d 523 (2009).
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C. Jones v. Murdoch
In Jones v. Murdoch, the New Mexico Supreme Court established a
new pre-indictment procedure to handle controversies that arise when a
prosecutor chooses not to alert the grand jury of evidence that the target
feels is exculpatory.
1. Facts of the Case
On April 17, 2007, James Bort Jones (Jones) approached Clemente
Moreno (Moreno), a man who was trespassing at the apartment building
that Mr. Jones owned.153 Mr. Jones had previously asked Mr. Moreno to
leave the premises, in part because he knew that Mr. Moreno was a drug
dealer.154 Mr. Jones believed that Mr. Moreno was going to strike him
when he was asked to leave, so “[f]earing for his safety, Mr. Jones struck
Mr. Moreno in the face with an open hand.”155 After he struck Mr.
Moreno, Mr. Jones left in his truck to go to the courthouse to get eviction
papers for Moreno’s girlfriend.156 Upon returning to the apartment building, Mr. Jones was arrested.157 Mr. Moreno told police that Mr. Jones
pointed a gun at him and struck him in the face while telling him to get
off of the property.158
Jimmy Michael Griego, an employee of Jones’, witnessed the confrontation.159 He first told police that he saw Jones slap Moreno in the
face without a gun present.160 However, in a later statement, he told police that Jones had put something in his laundry basket, and in a third
statement, he told police he had seen a gun when Jones and Moreno were
arguing.161 Mr. Griego later admitted that he hid Jones’ knife and gun.162
Maria Benavidez told police that she had moved the gun from the laun-

153. Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus at 1, In re
Grand Jury Presentation Concerning James Bort Jones, 2009-NMSC-002, 200 P.3d 523
(2009) (No 30,977), 2008 WL 6487132 at*2 [hereinafter Amended Emergency Petition
for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Response to Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus at 2, In re Grand Jury Presentation Concerning James Bort Jones, 2009-NMSC002, 200 P.3d 523 (2009) (No 30,977), 2008 WL 6487133 at *2 [hereinafter Response
to Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus].
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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dry basket to an outside trashcan, where police later found a Kimber
semiautomatic handgun.163
More witnesses came forward reporting what they saw. Isaac Gallegos heard Jones say to Moreno, “I will kill you!,” and that Jones could
have Moreno “whacked.”164 Cynthia Fuentes, who also witnessed the argument, told police she saw Jones point the gun at Moreno and slap him,
but was unsure if he used the gun to hit Moreno.165 When police searched
Jones’ truck, they found a Kimber magazine and ammunition.166
On December 4, 2007, Mr. Jones hand delivered a written memorandum to the District Attorney’s office in an attempt to alert the grand
jury foreperson of exculpatory evidence.167 Jones was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and tampering with evidence.168 Jones wanted to present evidence
to rebut the allegation that a gun was used to commit battery against the
victim.169 Jones presented witness testimony, that included from Ms.
Fuentes and Mr. Gallegos who both said the gun was not used. He also
provided evidence of Moreno’s past efforts to subvert the criminal justice
system by bribing his girlfriend to avoid her testifying.170
The district attorney was reluctant to let the grand jury look at the
evidence contained in Mr. Jones’ memorandum because she believed it
contained “improper summaries of the anticipated evidence, irrelevant
evidence, and improper instructions on the law.”171 In fact, Mr. Jones’ defense counsel filed a Petition for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus to
compel the disclosure of this potentially exculpatory evidence because
the district attorney refused to present Jones’ letter to the grand jury.172

163. Id.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, supra note
153, at 1.
168. Id.
169. Id. 1–2.
170. Id.
171. Response to Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, supra note 158, at 3.
172. Amended Emergency Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, supra note
153, at 2.

R

R
R
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2. Procedural History
At issue in Jones’ and the District Attorney’s dispute was what evidence would be appropriate under NMSA section 31-6-11(B).173 After
Jones initially filed his petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, a
hearing was set before the supreme court on March 12, 2008.174 However,
Mr. Jones had first filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor
to give his letter to the grand jury.175 During the first oral arguments
before the supreme court, Jones changed his request from a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor, to a writ of superintending control to
compel the grand jury judge to resolve the dispute.176 After the hearing,
the supreme court said it would “treat the petition for a writ of mandamus as a writ for superintending control,” and ordered the parties to address five issues:
1. The intent and interpretation of the 2003 amendments to Section 31-6-11(B).
2. What, if any, enforcement mechanisms are appropriate to carry
out the legislative intent?
3. What remedies are available for a violation of Section 31-6-11
(B)?
4. What standard should be applied by the courts in determining
whether a remedy for violation is appropriate?
5. Whether review for a violation should occur pre-indictment or
post-indictment?177

173. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003) (“It is the duty of the grand
jury to weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and when it has reason to believe that
other lawful, competent and relevant evidence is available that would disprove or
reduce a charge or accusation or that would make an indictment unjustified, then it
shall order the evidence produced. At least twenty-four hours before grand jury proceedings begin, the target or his counsel may alert the grand jury to the existence of
evidence that would disprove or reduce an accusation or that would make an indictment unjustified, by notifying the prosecuting attorney who is assisting the grand jury
in writing regarding the existence of that evidence.”).
174. Brief for Petitioner in Support of Petition for a Writ of Superintending Control at 1, In re Grand Jury Presentation Concerning James Bort Jones, 2009-NMSC002, 200 P.3d 523 (2009) (No 30,977), 2008 WL 648135 at * 1 [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner in Support of Petition for a Writ of Superintending Control].
175. Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 3, 200 P.3d 523, 526 (2009).
176. Id.
177. Brief for Petitioner in Support of Petition for a Writ of Superintending Control, supra note 174, at 3.

R
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3. The New Mexico Supreme Court’s Ruling
After concluding that a live controversy existed,178 the New Mexico
Supreme Court focused its opinion on the procedural question, not a substantive one.179 The attorney general, who provided an amicus curiae
brief, claimed “that this Court lacks the authority to exercise superintending control over the grand jury because it is an independent institution
separate and apart from the judiciary.”180 The court responded by noting
that it is incorrect to think that judicial action addressing a dispute between a target and the prosecutor would undermine the independence of
the grand jury.181 The court would not require the grand jury to consider
the evidence, but only be “alerted to its existence” if it met the requirements of the statute.182
The New Mexico Supreme Court further answered the attorney general’s concern with judicial involvement by noting that the relationship
between the court and the grand jury is an interdependent relationship.183
“The grand jury is an arm of the court,”184 and as an arm, the “[c]ourts
have a particular responsibility to prevent unfairness in Grand Jury proceedings.”185 The attorney general based his belief that the court should
have no supervisory control over the grand jury on United States v. Williams, a decision decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.186
The New Mexico Supreme Court distinguished Williams on two
grounds. First, Williams dealt with a post-indictment inquiry into the propriety of the government failing to provide significantly exculpatory evidence, which would require overturning an indictment.187 However, Jones
dealt with a pre-indictment scenario requiring no second guessing of how
the grand jury would have acted.188 The second distinguishing factor was
the absence of a guiding statute in Williams, while there was one in

178. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 6-8, 200 P.3d at 526-27. There was a question
about whether or not Jones withdrew the letter. The court found that Jones was willing to redraft the letter, but was not completely withdrawing it. Id. ¶7, 200 P.3d at 527.
The court also believed that there would be a dispute between Jones and the prosecutor about what evidence would be allowed to go to the grand jury. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 9, 200 P.3d at 527.
180. Id. ¶ 10, 200 P.3d at 528.
181. Id. ¶ 11, 200 P.3d at 528.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 13, 200 P.3d at 528.
184. Id. (quoting People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380, 388 (1971)).
185. Id. (quoting People v. Ianniello, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (N.Y. 1968)).
186. Id. ¶ 14, 200 P.3d at 529.
187. Id. ¶ 15, 200 P.3d at 529.
188. Id.
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Jones.189 In Williams, the Court eluded to the power of the Court to “dismiss an indictment because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least
where that misconduct amounts to a violation of one of those few, clear
rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by
Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.”190 The
New Mexico Supreme Court used section 31-6-11(B) to uphold the integrity of the grand jury function by allowing the target to alert the prosecutor to exculpatory evidence.191 As a result, the New Mexico Supreme
Court found that Williams actually supported the U.S. Supreme Court’s
position of supervisory control over the grand jury.192
The attorney general believed that the court did not need to get
involved because the target had other remedies already available to correct any mistake that could arise from his evidence not being presented to
the grand jury.193 These included the target’s ability to file a motion to
dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial bad faith, to obtain an interlocutory appeal if that motion is denied, or the target could file “a direct appeal at the conclusion of the criminal proceeding if ultimately
convicted.”194 The New Mexico Supreme Court found that these remedies
were inadequate for two reasons.195 First, each remedy occurred post-indictment and therefore could not “remedy the harm flowing from an unjustified indictment itself.”196 When a person is indicted, they are
irreparably injured by the stigma which accompanies the indictment, including potential employment concerns, stain in the public eye, economic
loss, and lost opportunity for education.197 In addition to the general stain
of an indictment, the target would face a procedural disadvantage as an
indicted defendant.198 The target turned defendant would face a higher
burden to gain relief.199 He would need to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence by showing bad faith on the part of the prosecutor.200
A target is more likely to gain relief when a pre-indictment procedure is in place. A pre-indictment remedy “is not dependent on establish-

189. Id. ¶ 16, 200 P.3d at 529.
190. Id. ¶ 16, 200 P.3d at 530 (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46
(1992)).
191. Id. ¶ 16, 200 P.3d at 530.
192. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 200 P.3d at 530.
193. Id. ¶ 17, 200 P.3d at 530.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. ¶ 18, 200 P.3d at 530.
197. See id.
198. Id. ¶ 19, 200 P.3d at 531.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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ing prosecutorial motive but instead focuses on whether the evidence the
target wants before the grand jury meets the appropriate evidentiary
standard.”201 Through a pre-indictment procedure the court would not
have to give deference to the grand jury decision like it would in a postindictment fight, thereby helping protect the target from adverse effects
of an improper indictment.202 As a result, the court rejected the argument
that there were other available remedies for the target.203
The attorney general also questioned whether the legislature has the
power to affect and control the workings of the grand jury by enacting
Section 31-6-11(B).204 The court said that the “heart of this case involves
the statutorily-created right of the target to alert the grand jury to exculpatory evidence.”205 The statute does not compel the grand jury to hear
the target’s evidence, but instead requires the grand jury to be made
aware of the evidence by using the prosecutor as a conduit to its introduction.206 This statute simply provides more opportunity for the grand jury
to exercise its independence by being presented with all pertinent evidence, while retaining the ability to choose not to hear it.207 The legislature exercised its plenary power in providing a way for the grand jury to
operate more effectively, by establishing guidelines for the introduction
of exculpatory evidence presented by the target.208
Even though the legislature provided guidelines for the introduction
of evidence, they did not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes arising under section 31-6-11(B).209 The attorney general, in applying a plain
language analysis, viewed the absence of the mechanism as a limitation
on the court’s ability to establish one.210 The target, along with New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association (NMCDLA), which also provided an amicus curiae brief, looked at the statute by considering the
totality of the 2003 amendment to the statute.211 According to the NMCDLA it did not make sense to refuse to give the target a manner of recourse when a prosecutor chooses not to notify the grand jury of
exculpatory evidence.212 In support of this position, the court looked at
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶ 20, 200 P.3d at 531.

¶ 21, 200 P.3d at 531.
¶ 24, 200 P.3d at 532.
¶ 25, 200 P.3d at 532.
¶ 22, 200 P.3d at 531.
¶ 26, 200 P.3d at 532.
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the 2003 amendment’s added words to the statute.213 An addition to the
introductory clause stated that the target should give the evidence to the
prosecutor at least twenty-four hours before the grand jury hearing; this
the court viewed as the legislature’s intent to provide the prosecutor with
time to screen the evidence.214 The court believed that the legislature
could easily foresee a prosecutor unwilling to present potentially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury that the target was using and relying on to
avoid an unwarranted indictment.215 Also, according to the court the legislature intended to provide the grand jury access to more information
from the target, which goes against any concept of the prosecutor having
“unbridled discretion during the screening process.”216
Given the legislature’s 2003 amendments, it would be unreasonable
to assume that the legislature wanted to provide the target a greater opportunity to provide evidence to the grand jury, while at the same time
give a prosecutor unlimited discretion to decide not to provide the target’s exculpatory evidence.217 The court held that the purpose of the statute, along with the time provided to identify evidentiary disputes between
the target and the prosecutor, reflected the legislature’s anticipation of
the grand jury judge to take part in resolving disputes.218 However, because there was the potential of putting strain on grand jury judges, now
having to oversee pre-grand jury evidentiary fights, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the legislature’s silence in the statute on this
issue as an opportunity to provide a procedural framework for pre-indictment disputes.219
As a result, the court established a new procedure to address section
31-6-11(B) so that prosecutors would not be able to circumvent the law.220
Before establishing the procedure, the court looked at the other ways
states provided for their courts to address conflicts over exculpatory evidence presented to the grand jury.221 The court believed that providing
the pre-indictment mechanism to address evidentiary issues would improve the reliability of the grand jury system as well as decrease the number of post-indictment requests for relief.222

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. ¶ 27, 200 P.3d at 533.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28, 200 P.3d at 533.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 200 P.3d at 533.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30, 200 P.3d at 534.
Id. ¶ 31, 200 P.3d at 534.
Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 32, 200 P.3d at 534.
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4. Pre-Indictment Procedure
The court provided new procedures for the target, the prosecutor,
and the grand jury judge to resolve conflicts of what evidence should be
presented to the grand jury. The court first acknowledged that Section 316-11(B) only “provides that the target may alert the grand jury to the
existence of exculpatory evidence by notifying the prosecutor.”223 The evidence that the target wants the grand jury to consider would have to comply with the standards set out in section 31-6-11.224 Under subsection (A)
of the statute, the evidence would have to be, “lawful, competent and
relevant.”225 In addition, under subsection (B), the evidence would have
to “disprove or reduce an accusation or . . . make an indictment
unjustified.”226
The prosecutor plays an essential part in getting qualified exculpatory evidence from the target to the grand jury. In doing so, the prosecutor needs “to be fair and impartial at all times during the grand jury
proceedings,”227 following his duty to “protect both the public’s interest
and the rights of the accused.”228 A prosecutor may feel that the evidence
presented by the target does not meet the statutory requirements, or may
simply choose not to present it. Either way, clear procedure needs to be
in place so that the prosecutor can be a fair and just participant in the
grand jury process.
Similar to the first letter presented by the target in Jones, often
times the evidence is inappropriate for the grand jury, and cannot be forwarded to it.229 The court said that letters from targets intended for the
grand jury should “focus on simply providing the grand jury with a factual
and nonargumentative description of the nature of any tangible evidence
and the substance of the potential testimony of any suggested
witnesses.”230
Along with the letter containing the basic factual evidence, the target should include a separate cover letter or memorandum.231 This cover
letter would not be sent to the grand jury, but would be for the benefit of

223. Id. ¶ 33, 200 P.3d at 535.
224. Id.
225. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(A) (2003).
226. Id. §31-6-11(B).
227. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 33, 200 P.3d at 535 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN.
1978, § 31-6-7(D) (2003)).
228. Id. (quoting State v. Cruz, 99 N.M. 690, 692 (1983)).
229. Id. ¶ 34, 200 P.3d at 535.
230. Id.
231. Id. ¶ 35, 200 P.3d at 535.
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the prosecutor and judge, to convey contextual information as well as an
argument for the propriety of the evidence.232
If the prosecutor chooses not to forward the information after considering both the letter and cover letter, he is required to file a motion
with the grand jury judge, as well as notify the target.233 “In the motion
filed with the grand jury judge, the prosecutor should provide the grand
jury judge with the target’s letter submitting the proposed evidence, and
the prosecutor’s motion should state why the prosecutor believes the
grand jury should not be alerted to the existence of the target-offered
evidence.”234 Notification to the target by the prosecutor is necessary because of the secret nature of the grand jury proceedings.235 The target has
no way of knowing whether his evidence was presented to the grand jury
until after the grand jury has indicted him. At that point, the only remedies available to the target would be those which the court has already
viewed as inadequate.
The grand jury judge has the power to rule on the admissibility of
the evidence and on whether the grand jury should be made aware of the
evidence. This is done by applying the standards set out in section 31-611,236 with the understanding that the legislature intended to give the
grand jury access to more evidence.237 As a result, when the arguments
are relatively balanced, the judge should rule in favor of disclosing the
evidence to the grand jury.238 Because of the intent of the legislature to
provide access to evidence, the burden rests on the prosecutor to show
why the evidence should not be presented to the grand jury.239 Using his
discretion, the grand jury judge should timely act to provide direction to
both sides, as well as preserve the record.240
However, the grand jury judge does not have the power to ensure
the prosecutor “questions the witness in the manner proposed by the target or otherwise elicits the evidence in the way that the target intended.”241 The grand jury still has the power to decline to hear such
evidence.242 It would also be impractical for a judge to try to control the
flow of the presentation and examination of evidence in a grand jury
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003).
See Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 39, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id. ¶ 37, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id.
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hearing, since so much depends on the way witnesses answer questions,
and on questions asked by grand jury members.243 Lastly, judicial interference in deciding how a prosecutor should present information would
“usurp[ ] the prosecutor’s rightful role before the grand jury.”244
The prosecutor could proceed in a way that would essentially nullify
the target’s evidence. The court recognized that “an overzealous prosecutor could call a witness as requested by the target but then intentionally
question the witness in a manner intended to keep the witness from providing the grand jury with information that the target wanted before the
grand jury.”245 The only remedy for the target at that point would be to
wait for the indictment and review the record of the grand jury transcript.246 The target would still be left at the procedural disadvantage of
needing to prove prosecutorial bad faith.247
However, the existence of the pre-indictment procedure involving
the grand jury judge offers protection for a target against a prosecutor
who is unwilling to alert the grand jury of exculpatory evidence.248 The
pre-indictment procedure allows the grand jury judge to enforce section
31-6-11(B) by holding a hearing or by placing an order regarding the admissibility of the evidence based on the parties’ motions.249 The procedure
also provides a target protection when a prosecutor is still reluctant to
offer the evidence after a ruling by the grand jury judge, by providing the
target the record of the ruling on the evidence in the pre-indictment hearing, which could aid the target in establishing prosecutorial bad faith in a
post-indictment hearing.250
5. Conclusion of Jones
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Jones, was focused on establishing a more efficient and equitable grand jury in line with the legislative intent of Section 31-6-11(B). The grand jury judge provides a check
on improper evidence being admitted by the target, while at the same
time providing a check on the prosecutor’s screening function.251 Having a

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 38, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id.
Id.
See id. ¶ 39, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id. ¶ 36, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id. ¶ 39, 200 P.3d at 536.
Id. ¶ 42, 200 P.3d at 537.
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pre-indictment process limits the need for post-indictment hearings and
helps protect targets from the negative effects of being indicted.252
V. ANALYSIS
The new rule established by the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Jones settled the issue of presenting potentially exculpatory evidence to a
grand jury when there is a dispute about its admissibility under section
31-6-11(B). While it may not substantially affect New Mexico grand jury
practice, the ruling provides a mechanism of relief for targets when a
prosecutor is unwilling to present exculpatory evidence. By creating this
new procedure, the New Mexico Supreme Court went against the federal
view of the historical relationship between the court, legislature, and
grand jury.
The new procedure established by Jones also protects the historical
tension of the grand jury. The modern grand jury is the product of two
distinct bodies with opposing purposes converging together. The tension
has been whether the role of the grand jury should be to investigate and
indict, or to screen and protect. Each of the opposing powers serves society by ensuring that justice is carried out. The New Mexico approach to
the proper function of the grand jury, unlike the federal, alleviates the
tension between each of the grand jury’s roles, allowing both purposes to
work for the benefit of society.
A. Supervisory Control
Unlike the federal courts, the New Mexico Supreme Court believes
that courts can exercise supervisory power over the grand jury. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in Williams, stressed the independent nature of grand
juries, denying the grand jury’s connection to the court,253 while the New
Mexico Supreme Court views the grand jury as an “appendage of the
court.”254
The federal position incorrectly views the relationship between the
courts and grand juries as two independent spheres. This limits federal
courts’ power over grand juries to only the most extreme cases of misconduct. The Court is not to prescribe any new rules or limitations on the
grand jury, which leaves the grand jury unencumbered by technical rules
as it carries out its duty to bring charges against the rightfully accused.255

252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
Id. ¶ 13, 200 P.3d at 528.
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
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Controlled by this view, the Supreme Court was afraid to reshape the
idea of the grand jury by requiring the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
information.
Conversely, the New Mexico view of the relationship between the
court and grand jury is one of interdependence. The grand jury in New
Mexico is not independent once it is summoned, but is always connected
to the court. The court is the body that calls the grand jury, and once it is
called, it is not left uncontrolled to act according to its own will. Instead,
the court has a supervisory duty over the grand jury to ensure that it, and
its process, is not abused or “used for purposes of oppression and
injustice.”256
The New Mexico Supreme Court was careful to point out that the
ruling in Jones would not undermine the independence of the grand jury.
The result of requiring a pre-indictment procedure to determine the appropriateness of disclosing exculpatory evidence offered by the target to
the grand jury does not put any obligation on the grand jury.257 The grand
jury is still free to refuse to hear or consider the evidence.258 The only
imposition is that which the court places on a prosecutor who is reluctant
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.259 This new mechanism
provides more information to the grand jury, and allows it to fully fulfill
its historical roles of accusing and protecting.
B. Historical Limitation
In Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus was on a limited historical scope of the grand jury. The Court viewed the role of the federal
grand jury to assess whether there is a basis for bringing criminal
charges.260 In order to assess the basis for bringing charges, only the prosecutor’s presentation of evidence is required. This one-sided presentation
of evidence to the grand jury is viewed to be completely independent
from the influence of the federal judiciary.
The federal grand jury system has been perceived as an “important
instrument of effective law enforcement.”261 The grand jury can use its
power to subpoena witnesses, look at evidence which would be inadmissible in trial, and coerce testimony of witnesses, all as a “convenient tool

256. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 13, 200 P.3d at 529 (quoting In re Nat’l Window
Glass Workers, 287 F. 219, 225 (N.D. Ohio 1922)).
257. Id. ¶¶ 11–12, 200 P.3d at 528.
258. Id.¶ 12, 200 P.3d at 528.
259. See id. ¶ 11, 200 P.3d at 528.
260. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
261. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974).
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for the prosecutor.”262 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion focused on preserving this power in Williams, when it was established that the grand jury
did not need exculpatory evidence disclosed because its duty is simply to
charge.263
Justice Scalia was concerned with imposing an obligation on the
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence for the target to the grand
jury, which he thought was not in line with the historical purpose of a
grand jury.264 This was based on the view that “the grand jury’s function
[is] not ‘to enquire . . . upon what foundation [the charge may be] denied,’ or otherwise to try the suspect’s defenses, but only to examine
‘upon what foundation [the charge] is made’ by the prosecutor.”265 Thus,
according to the Court, targets to an investigation are not allowed to
tender their own defenses to the grand jury.266 An exculpatory rule was
viewed to allow the target to “circumnavigate the system by delivering his
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,” who would then be required to
present it to the grand jury.267 However, the grand jury has been able to
choose when they have heard enough evidence, and has been under no
obligation to hear exculpatory evidence in the past.268 As a result, the
court did not want to “convert a non-existent duty of the grand jury itself
into an obligation of the prosecutor.”269
The U.S. Supreme Court limited the grand jury to a role of a charging body, neglecting an essential historical purpose of the grand jury.
Throughout history, the purpose of the grand jury has been confused by
dual roles.270 Historically, the “the grand jury served for centuries both as
a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action.”271 Yet contrary to this wellrecognized fact of grand jury history, the Court used a lopsided view of
history, focusing only on the power to accuse, at the cost of the power to
protect.272 It is easy to see that with two contrary functions, it could be
difficult to determine whether laws should reflect the power and purpose
262. JUDY MEAD, THE GRAND JURIES: AN AMERICAN INQUISITION 1–3 (1977).
263. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51–52.
264. Id. at 51.
265. Id. at 51–52 (quoting Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. 236, 1 Dall. 236, 1 L. Ed.
116 (O. T. Phila. 1788)).
266. Id. at 53.
267. Id. at 52.
268. Id. at 53.
269. Id.
270. See EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 7, 28.
271. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342–43 (1974).
272. See Cassidy, supra note 45, at 366.
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to accuse and ferret out crimes, or to focus on the purpose of the grand
jury to “protect innocent persons from accusations not supported by
probable cause.”273 The federal courts have eased this burden by eliminating one of the functions, the latter, from the discussion.
The Williams decision elevated the accusatorial role of the grand
jury at the expense of its “core screening function,” when the Court ruled
that courts have no authority to impose a duty on the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence.274
C. Legislative Plenary Power and State Statute
Even though the federal courts have decided that there is no requirement to present exculpatory evidence, about one-quarter of states
have either a statute or judicial decision which requires prosecutors to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.275 These rules limit the
excessive power of prosecutors, increase the likelihood that the innocent
will be exonerated and “strengthen the grand jury’s ability to screen out
weak cases.”276 New Mexico is one of the states that established a
prosecutorial duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.277
New Mexico’s statutory acknowledgement that the grand jury
should be made aware of exculpatory evidence was one of two distinguishing factors between the ruling in Williams, and the New Mexico Supreme Court ruling in Jones v. Murdoch. The Williams Court had no
federal statute requiring that exculpatory evidence be presented to the
grand jury and relied solely on the supervisory power of the court to impose such a rule.278
Even though the federal courts cannot exercise their supervisory
control over the grand jury, Williams implies they could have done so if
acting “based on an existing statute or court rule.”279 Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that the Williams decision supported their
view of imposing the duty on prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence
because there was a clear rule established by the state legislature.280 Even

273. Id. at 362.
274. Id. at 372.
275. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:17 (2d ed.
1997) (current through 2011) [hereinafter BEALE ET AL. 2d ed.].
276. Id.
277. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003).
278. See Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 200 P.3d 523, 529 (2009).
279. Id. ¶ 16, 200 P.3d. at 530.
280. Id.
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though New Mexico grand juries are viewed as independent bodies at
common law, they are still subject to the legislature’s plenary power.281
The New Mexico Legislature’s plenary power allowed it to create a
rule that permits a target to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. The New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision stands in contrast to the
federal view of the legislature’s relationship to the grand jury. The federal
view is that the grand jury is not assigned to any branch of government
because of its place in the Bill of Rights.282 Similarly, the New Mexico
grand jury is not textually assigned to any branch in the New Mexico
Constitution. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the
legislature could establish a rule about exculpatory evidence, because the
state constitution is silent on the matter, and the legislature, as the voice
of the people, is in the best position to act.283 Further, the New Mexico
Supreme Court stated that the common law view of grand jury independence did not preclude “the Legislature from enacting statutes to improve the grand jury system.”284
The New Mexico Legislature has tried to make the grand jury system more fair and independent by attempting to give it “greater access to
pertinent evidence.”285 Other New Mexico laws emphasize that both the
prosecutor and the grand jurors must “conduct themselves in a fair and
impartial manner at all times during grand jury proceedings.”286 Furthermore, in 2003, the legislature passed a law which established that the target may alert the grand jury of exculpatory evidence through the
prosecutor.287
The law created by the legislature increases the independence of the
grand jury and protects its historical purpose. It provides the “grand jury
greater access to pertinent evidence” by hearing exculpatory evidence
that could have previously been withheld by the prosecutor.288 Because
the requirement rests on the prosecutor, the legislative imposition really
falls on prosecutors, not the grand jury. While the prosecutor is required
to alert the grand jury to the evidence, the grand jury is still free to refuse

281. See id. ¶ 22, 200 P.3d at 531. (“The state legislature, directly representative of
the people, has broad plenary powers. If a state constitution is silent on a particular
issue, the legislature should be the body of government to address the issue.” (quoting
State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 575, 904 P.2d 11, 24 (1995))).
282. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
283. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 22, 200 P.3d at 531.
284. Id. ¶ 25, 200 P.3d at 532.
285. Id.
286. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-7(D) (2003).
287. See id.
288. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 200 P.3d at 532.
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to hear it.289 The value of requiring the prosecutor to alert the grand jury
to exculpatory evidence is that it provides a meaningful buffer between
the agenda of the prosecuting office and the workings of the grand jury.
When the grand jury knows exculpatory evidence exists, the grand jury
ceases being the puppet of the prosecutor and becomes engaged in both
of their historical roles: accuser and protector.
While the New Mexico Supreme Court has tried to be cautious in
applying any rules to the grand jury,290 it said that the heart of Jones v.
Murdoch was “the statutorily-created right of the target to alert the grand
jury to exculpatory evidence.”291 In line with the reasoning of Williams,
the court saw a clear rule established by the legislature, meant to increase
the independent functioning of the grand jury. Section 31-6-11(B) provides the grand jury with the choice of hearing or denying exculpatory
evidence, a power they would not have if the prosecutor did not make
them aware of the evidence.292 Thus, the statute establishes that the prosecutor is the conduit that the target uses to alert the grand jury. This type
of rule was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, which feared that the
grand jury’s historical role could be injured.293 On the contrary, the New
Mexico Supreme Court found that the legislature could utilize their plenary power to create rules to protect the dual roles and independence of
the grand jury. When the legislature was silent on the process to enforce
the presentation of exculpatory evidence, the New Mexico Supreme
Court recognized that it was in the best position to provide a pre-indictment procedural framework.294
D. Importance of Pre-Indictment Remedy
The second distinguishing factor between Williams and Jones is that
Williams dealt with a post-indictment decision whereas Jones established
a pre-indictment procedure.
The Supreme Court, in Williams, was reluctant to interfere with an
independent grand jury’s finding of probable cause.295 The Supreme
Court believed they were in no position to second-guess the basis of a
grand jury’s decision. Grand juries are free to hear evidence offered by
the prosecution and free to refuse what they feel is unnecessary. The
Court did not want to impede on this power by overturning a grand jury’s

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See id. ¶ 37, 200 P.3d at 536.
See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 696–97, 634 P.2d 1244, 1248–49 (1981).
Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 24, 200 P.3d at 532.
See id.
See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992).
Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 29, 200 P.3d at 533.
See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
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indictment simply because the prosecutor chose not to offer exculpatory
evidence.
The New Mexico Supreme Court faced a very different question in
Jones because the grand jury had not yet acted to indict or dismiss. No
evidence had been presented, nor had witnesses been called. Instead, the
New Mexico Supreme Court was trying to decide what mechanism should
be in place when a conflict arises between the target and the prosecutor
about the presentation of exculpatory evidence.
The pre-indictment procedure affects this interaction between the
target and the prosecutor. When a dispute arises between the target and
prosecutor over whether exculpatory evidence should be presented to the
grand jury, the matter is resolved by a magistrate judge. However, the
magistrate judge’s ruling places no obligation on the grand jury to hear
any evidence, only on the prosecutor to apprise the grand jury of the
evidence.296 The grand jury is still free to refuse any evidence it wishes. As
a result, the pre-indictment procedure helps protect the grand jury’s independence. Moreover, the grand jury is no longer restricted to hear only
what the prosecutor wants it to hear. Instead, it is made aware of more
information, which it can accept to hear so as to carryout its duty to properly decide if a target should be indicted.
The target is greatly benefitted by having a pre-indictment procedure as an aid to the grand jury’s screening function. One of the grand
jury’s purposes it to reject cases without merit. This is done in secrecy to
protect the interests of the target. Harm beyond being formally charged
results when a person is indicted. Charged people are subject to economic
losses, emotional stress, social stigma, and possible lost educational and
employment opportunities.297 The process adopted in Jones would allow
targets a mode of remedy before such consequences attach.
E. Policy Implications
The view of the U.S. Supreme Court is in opposition to administrative views on how a grand jury should be run.298 The Department of Justice disagrees with the Williams opinion and requires prosecutors to
disclose evidence that negates the target’s guilt.299 Even though this is a

296. See id. ¶ 37, 200 P.3d at 536.
297. Id. ¶ 18, 200 P.3d at 530–31.
298. See FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 137 (“[T]he Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.” (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 52–54)).
299. Id. at 137 (stating that under the Department of Justice policy “prosecutors
must disclose to the grand jury ‘substantial evidence,’ known to the prosecutor, if that
evidence negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation”).
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Department of Justice policy, the obligation on federal prosecutors to
present exculpatory evidence is not required by either the U.S. Constitution or any federal statute, and courts have not followed the Department
of Justice’s policy.300
The position of the Department of Justice better protects the historical roles of the grand jury. The prosecutor’s role is not to merely convict
but to ensure that “justice is done.”301 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Department of Justice believes that the prosecutor’s role of seeking
justice is aided by providing the grand jury with exculpatory evidence.302
The production of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury allows the jurors to properly weigh matters and ensure that “the guilty shall not escape nor the innocent suffer.”303
The New Mexico view better protects the interests of justice. The
dual roles of the grand jury serve the single purpose of reaching justice.
When one of the roles of the grand jury is taken away, justice cannot be
served. The New Mexico laws and procedure set forth in Jones protect
the dual nature of the grand jury by focusing on providing it with the
proper evidence to make an informed, just decision.304 The goal is to justly
indict individuals. With proper checks up front, post-indictment issues
should decrease, resulting in a more efficient and fair judicial system.305
VI. CONCLUSION
The procedure established in Jones provides pre-indictment protection for targets by allowing them to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. However, this procedure will not affect most grand jury cases.
The need for the pre-indictment procedure arises only when a target offers potentially exculpatory evidence and the prosecutor refuses to present it. Additionally, a ruling by the magistrate in favor of the target will
only occur if the evidence is “lawful, competent and relevant . . . that
would disprove or reduce a charge or accusation or that would make an
indictment unjustified.”306 Even though the pre-indictment procedure will
be applicable in select cases, its presence protects the few individuals who
will need it.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

BEALE ET AL. 2d ed., supra note 275, § 9:27.
FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 18.
See id. at 639.
FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 18.
See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-302A (which put the Jones decision into rules).
See Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 32, 200 P.3d 523, 534 (2009).
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (2003).
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New Mexico’s legislative and judicial approach to involvement in
the grand jury process is different than that taken by the U.S. Congress
and Supreme Court. Protecting the independence of the grand jury in
New Mexico does not mean that the legislature and the courts should
turn a blind eye, deferring to a historical view of grand juries working
unbridled by rules. Instead, both the New Mexico Legislature and the
state’s courts are active in creating and upholding procedures to ensure
that the tension of the grand jury continues, so that the grand jury may
continue to work as both a sword and a shield.

